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Abstract 
 
This article aims to explore  the independence of the judiciary as an important pillar of a rule of law. 
Independence of the judiciary is a necessary condition for maintaining the rule of law, only 
constitutional law has legitimacy that must be upheld and the court should have the ability to perform 
a task in deciding the law. The independence of judges to examine, prosecute and deciding have 
guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 and Act No. 48 of 2009 on 
Judicial Power, with the purpose judge in his judicial function can actually examine, prosecute and 
deciding on cases based on the law and justice. 
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Abstrak 
Tulisan ini bertujuan mengeksplorasi independensi peradilan sebagai pilar penting sebuah negara 
hukum. Independesi peradilan merupakan kondisi yang diperlukan untuk memelihara negara hukum, 
hanya hukum yang secara konstitusional memiliki legitimasi yang harus ditegakkan dan pengadilan 
harus memiliki kemampuan untuk melakukan tugas dalam memutuskan hukum tersebut. Penormaan 
independensi hakim dalam melaksanakan fungsi kekuasaan kehakiman melalui peradilan-peradilan 
negara diatur dalam Pasal 24 ayat (1), ayat (2) dan ayat (3) UUD NRI Tahun 1945. Juga Pasal 1 Butir 1 
dan Pasal 3 ayat (1) dan ayat (2) UU No. 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman.  
 
Kata kunci: hakim, kemandirian peradilan, kekuasaan kehakiman. 
 
 
Preface 
The independence of the judge as the exe-
cutor of the judicial power has been a long deba-
te in the constitutional history since the birth of 
the idea or notion of state law. Pros and cons of 
the need for freedom is given to the judge as the 
executor of the judicial power is born of pragma-
tism dealing with progressive ideology. 
Judiciary independent and impartial is one 
of the important principles to support building a 
modern law state. As a consequence of this prin-
ciple, the judge in his judicial duties should not 
be influenced by anyone, including by various in-
terests, including the interests of positions (poli-
tical) or the interests of money (economic). 
The judge is not merely the application of 
the law through the method of syllogism (trum-
pet/funnel law), unless the judge is the imple-
menter, the inventor (law judge finding) and 
forming law (judge-made law) fair and wise. The-
refore, the judge should not be bond only to the 
law within the meaning of the legislation is load-
ed with the dominant interests of a powerful mi-
nority (the ruler). 
There should be a legal guarantee to crea-
te the independence of judges, so that the judge 
can be free from all forms of intervention of sta-
te power and administration, free from any form 
of intimidation of other coercive powers, and 
free from threats that can affect the load psy-
chological and physic while being judge and after 
the verdict. 
Facts on the ground show that many judges 
have not been able to maintain its independen-
ce. In accordance Reports Semester I (January-
June) 2014 Judicial Commission, there were 
eight judges imposed severe sanctions (dishonor-
able dismissal, non hammer for two years, dis-
missal remains with pension rights), thirteen jud-
ges imposed moderate sanctions (non hammer 
for one year, the longest non-hammer six mon-
ths, a delay salary for one year, the longest non-
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hammer three months); forty-four judges impos-
ed mild sanctions (written reprimand, verbal re-
primand).1 
The above facts have reflected that an 
independent judiciary is still far from complete, 
even though the constitution has been asserted 
that "Judicial power is an independent power to 
organize judicial administration to uphold the 
law and justice". The principle of judicial inde-
pendence is one of the key principles of demo-
cracy. This principle requires that the judiciary 
free from interference, pressure, or coercion, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, of the power of other 
institutions, colleagues or superiors, as well as 
other parties outside the court. Based on the ex-
planation above, the formulation of the problem 
addressed in this paper is how far the existence 
of an independent judiciary as pillars of state law 
and how the norms of independence of judges as 
the executor of judicial power in Indonesia. 
 
Discussion 
Independence of the Judiciary Power as a Pil-
lar of State Law 
Judicial independence is a dynamic con-
cept that can be defined in different ways, gene-
rally simplify the meaning as judicial indepen-
dence from the executive and legislative bran-
ches of government.2 Judicial independence is 
recognized as an "indispensable condition" for a 
free society under the rule of law. The indepen-
dence implies freedom from interference by the 
executive or legislative in performing judicial 
functions.3 
Michael D. Gilbert gives a different defini-
tion of the independence of the judiciary, name-
ly the situation of a judge can not be penalized, 
and knows that he can not be punished by the 
other actors as a result of his decision. The judge 
                                                          
1  Anonim, Laporan Semester I, http://www.komisiyudisi-
al.go.id/statis-25-informasi-pengawasan-hakim.html,  
accessed on 28th January 2015. 
2   Frank B. Cross, “Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial In-
dependence”, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 64 No. 195, 
2003, Ohio St. L.J, page 209. 
3   Moosa Akefi Ghazi, “Iranian Judiciary Facing Human 
Rights Norms or Islamic Criteria”, Journal of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), Vol. 5, No. 3, 2011, 
page 40. 
can not accept punishment as a reduction in sa-
lary, loss of office of judges, prison, or other ha-
zards. "Other actors" including parties who get 
involved, legislators, bureaucrats, voters, intere-
st groups, other judges, and so on. The official 
decision means a decision in one's professional 
capacity as a judge.4 
Regarding the independence of the judicia-
ry, there are two perspectives. First, the pers-
pective of the separation of powers in the form 
of independence from other branches of power. 
Its aspects including organizational, administra-
tive, personnel, and financial; Second, the pers-
pective of democratic form of independence in 
making decisions. This relates to the special obli-
gation of the courts of the state of law. Justice 
is only one branch of government in the judicial 
power, but carry out the functions to ensure the 
establishment of a state of law, in which there is 
the protection of the independence of judges in 
deciding the case that is free from the influence 
of various interests.5 
The independence of the judiciary in the 
state law can be tested in two ways, namely 
impartiality and rupture relations with political 
actors (political insularity). Impartiality of the 
judge looks at the idea that the judges will base 
decisions on the law and facts at trial, not on the 
basis of association with one of the litigants. 
Impartiality of the judge is not something that is 
easily detected, in which case it can be tracked 
only as long as a judge of behavior vis-a-vis its 
association with the litigants in the context of 
social relations or political relations.6 
John Locke in the context of the separa-
tion of power teaches that power in a state dis-
tributed or divided into several organs of diffe-
rent state agencies, John Locke wrote: "It may 
be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt 
4  Michael D. Gilbert, “Judicial Independence and Social 
Welfare”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 112, Issue 4, 2014, 
page 582. 
5  Harlord See, “Comment Yudicial Selection and Decrisio-
nal Independence”, Law and Contenporary Problems, 
Vol. 61, No 3, Summer 1998, page 141-142. 
6  Agung Prastyo Wibowo, “Lembaga Eksaminasi Dalam 
Perspektif Peradilan Pidana Indonesia Upaya Pengujian 
Terhadap Putusan Hakim yang Tidak Memenuhi Rasa Ke-
adilan Masyarakat”, Jurnal Ilmu Hukum, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
March 2012, page 91. 
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to grasp at power, for the same persons who have 
the power of making laws, to have also in their 
hands the power to execute them, whereby they 
may exempt themselves from obedience to the 
laws they make, and suit the law, both in its ma-
king and execution, to their own private advan-
tage".7 
According to John Locke, to protect the 
accumulation of power only in certain organs of 
the state, it is necessary to distribute power to 
the several organs of state, to avoid the abuse of 
power if only focused on one organ. John Locke's 
theory further developed by Montesquieu, that is 
very dangerous if there is an overlap between the 
functions of the legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches of government, therefore, need to 
be separated, Montesquieu wrote: when the le-
gislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person or in the same body of Magistrates, 
there can be no liberty. Again, there is no liberty 
if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative and executive.8 
According to Montesquieu, for the esta-
blishment of democratic legal state should be a 
separation of state power into three axis powers, 
namely the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers. Legislative power, wherein the power in 
the formation of legislation. Executive power, 
covering power in the field of law enforcement. 
Judicial power (judicial), including the authority 
in the field of justice and the judiciary in order 
to enforce the legislation/enforcement (law en-
forcment). 
Trias Politica doctrine also supports the 
doctrine of state law. Both doctrines that (trias 
politica and state laws) are intertwined and in-
separable, like the two sides of the same coin. In 
the separation or division of powers, the empha-
sis is placed the independence of the judiciary 
power.9 
                                                          
7  Marina Kunnecke, 2007, Tradition and Change in Admi-
nistrative Law: An Anglo-German Comparison, Berlin: 
Springer, page 15. 
8   Sunday E. Edeko, “The Relevance of Separation of Powers 
in A Democratic System of Government: A Comparative 
Approach”, African Journal of Law and Criminology, Vol. 
1, No. 2, 2011, page 3. 
9  Sufiarina & Efa Laela Fakhria, “One Roof Judicial System 
in Indonesia”, Indonesia Law Review, Year 2 Vol. 3, Sep-
tember - December 2012, page 326. 
Aniagolu has explained the working of the 
principle of separation of powers, as written Sun-
day E. Edeko as follows: the principle of separa-
tion of powers is fundamental to our presidential 
Constitution. The Constitution both at the Fede-
ral and the State levels makes provision for three 
great departments of state the Legislative, Exe-
cutive and Judiciary. Provisions have been made 
in the Constitution as to the powers and func-
tions of each department.10 Thus, separation of 
power is the most basic thing for a country whose 
constitution adopts a constitution organize presi-
dential and legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of the functions and authority of each 
of each field. 
Independence of the judiciary is generally 
seen as a fundamental value for a state law.11 In 
a political system, the independence of the judi-
ciary as a requirement for the state of law.12 Se-
veral international documents and agreements 
such as the Basic Justice Principles of of the 
United Nations and the European Charter on the 
Status of Judges, stressed the importance of ju-
dicial independence and tried to explain the key 
elements of the judicial independence.13 
The main purpose of the independence of 
the judiciary is to facilitate three specific value. 
First, judicial independence is a necessary con-
dition for maintaining a state of law. Second, in 
a constitutional government, only law that is 
constitutionally legitimate to be enforced and 
the court should have the ability to perform a 
task in deciding the law. Therefore, there is a 
need for the court to have the freedom to cancel 
a law that violates these values. Third, in a de-
mocracy, the court must have a strong autonomy 
within resist the temptation to give too much 
respect to the economic or political power hol-
ders. 
10   Sunday E. Edeko, op,cit., page 11. 
11  R. De Lange & P.A.M. Mevis, “Constitutional Guarantees 
for the Independence of the Judiciary”  Electronic Jour-
nal of Comparative Law, Vol. 11 No. 1, May 2007. 
12  Thomas E. Plank, “The Essential Elements of Judicial 
Independence and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia”, 
William & Mary Bill Of Rights Journal, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 
1996.  page 3 
13  Arjana Llano, “Independence of the Judiciary”,  Juridical 
Tribune, Vol. 3, Issue 2, December 2013, page 109. 
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For a democratic constitutional state such 
as Indonesia, independent of the judicial power 
is needed and it is a primary requirement to be 
applied. Judicial power, in the context of Indo-
nesia is an independent state authority to con-
duct judiciary to uphold law and justice based on 
Pancasila, for the implementation of the State 
Law of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
The Norms of Independence of Judges as the 
Executor of Judicial Power in Indonesia 
Judicial independence is generally used to 
represent the judiciary, including the individual 
judge, as an independent agency of the interven-
tion of other parties. United Nations (UN) con-
firmed the seven principles of judicial indepen-
dence as a reference judges in performing judi-
cial power which was adopted from the Seventh 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at 
Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 
of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 
1985. 
Judicial power in the state system of In-
donesia is an independent power perpetrated by 
a Supreme Court and judicial bodies underneath, 
and by a Constitutional Court, to organize judi-
ciary to enforce the law and justice. Independent 
judiciary is independent in the sense, has been 
affirmed in Article 24 paragraph (1), (2) and (3) 
NRI Constitution of 1945, as follows: 
(1) Independent judiciary is an independent po-
wer to organize judicial administration to up-
hold the law and justice. 
(2) Independent judiciary shall be carried out by 
a Supreme Court and judicial bodies that are 
below it in the general courts, religious cour-
ts, military courts, administrative courts, 
and by a Constitutional Court. 
(3) Other agencies whose functions related to 
the judicial authorities stipulated in law. 
Constitutionally Article 24 of the Constitu-
tion NRI 1945 demanding and requires power 
really was impartial and that is free and inde-
pendent of the influence of the litigants, and not 
partial to either party in accordance with the 
principle of equal opportunity for each party (au-
di alteran partem or must give the same oppor-
tunity to call now party). Give equal treatment 
to the parties or also called equal dealing. In ad-
dition also have to completely free and indepen-
dent of the influence and executive grip or ruler 
(independence from the executive power) 
Independent judicial power when studied 
further in an independent, free from the in-
fluence of other powers of intervention, then the 
assertion of the basic law of the country, further 
developed in Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Po-
wer, as well as in Law No. 14 of 1985 on Supreme 
Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 on the 
Amendment of Law No. 14 of 1985 in conjunction 
with Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Second Amen-
dment Law No. 14 of 1985 on Supreme Court. In 
Article 1 point 1 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial 
Power affirmed: Judicial power is independent of 
state power to conduct judiciary to uphold law 
and justice based on Pancasila and the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945, for 
the implementation of State laws of the Republic 
of Indonesia. 
On Official Explanation point I Law No. 48 
of 2009 contains a more emphatic clarification 
about the existence of the independence of ju-
dicial authorities in the administration of justice. 
This, explained that: NRI Constitution of 1945 
affirms Indonesia is a state of law. In line with 
the provisions of the one of the important prin-
ciples of state law is a guarantee of the imple-
mentation of an independent judiciary, free from 
the influence of other powers to organize judi-
ciary to enforce the law and justice. 
Furthermore, emphasized in Article 3 pa-
ragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of Law No. 48 of 
2009, as follows: 
(1) In carrying out its duties and functions, jud-
ges and constitutional judges must maintain 
the independence of the judiciary. 
(2) Any interference in judicial affairs by other 
parties outside the judicial authority is pro-
hibited, except in cases referred to in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
Year 1945. 
The assertion of independence of judicial 
power above, the vertical structure and culmina-
ting in the Supreme Court. It was stipulated in 
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Article 2 of Law No. 14 of 1985 (amendment to 
Law No. 5 of 2004 Junto Law No. 3 of 2009), that: 
The Supreme Court is the Highest Court of the 
State of all courts, which in carrying out their 
duties free from the influence of government and 
other influences. 
Maintenance of an independent and ac-
countable judiciary is the basis of constitutiona-
lism and human rights protection. The emergen-
ce constitution Bill of Human Rights has revived 
awareness and concern about the role of the ju-
diciary as a forum that is used to search the indi-
vidual and collective justice and sustainability of 
democratic culture.14 
The independence of the judicial power is 
not only directed towards the institutional struc-
ture of the judiciary, but also against the judges 
of the courts in carrying out its functions in 
hearing and deciding a case that confronted him. 
Implementation of judicial power handed over to 
the judicial authorities stipulated by law with 
the main task to receive, examine and resolve 
each case submitted to it. 
The independence of judges is generally 
determined by two factors as set forth Arjana 
Llano that: first, with regard to how the judge 
maintained securely from improper influence of 
third parties (individuals or organizations); se-
cond, the extent to which judges think, act and 
make decisions independently of the specific fac-
tors actually and properly according to law.15 Ju-
dicial independence is determined by a good le-
gal framework, or the application in practice and 
perception of the judge against its independen-
ce.16 
In line with these basic tasks, then the 
court can not refuse to investigate and prosecute 
a case filed by yustisiabel on the pretext that the 
law does not exist or is less clear. This means 
that the court is obliged to examine, hear and 
decide a case filed by litigants. Article 10 para-
graph (1) of Law No. 48 of 2009, asserted that: 
Court prohibited refuse to examine, hear and 
decide a case filed under the pretext that the 
                                                          
14   Muna Ndulo, “Judicial Reform, Constitutionalism and the 
Rule of Law in Zambia: From a Justice System to a Just 
System”, Zambia Social Science Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
May 2011, page 4. 
law does not exist or is less clear, but obliged to 
examine and judge. 
Implementation of the duties and func-
tions of the judicial power which is run by the 
judges of the courts, is expected to uphold the 
law and justice are independent, independently, 
without any interference from the environment 
of other powers and influence of other elements 
beyond the interests of justice. On that basis, 
the judge is required to always perform excava-
tion, follow social dynamics, and understanding 
the legal values and sense of justice in society. 
The requirement that the judge, affirmed in 
Article 5 of Law No. 48 of 2009, that: 
(1) Judges and constitutional judge must have 
excavate, follow, and understand the legal 
value and sense of justice in society. 
(2) Judges and constitutional judge must have 
integrity and personality irreproachable, ho-
nest, fair, professional, and experienced in 
the field of law. 
(3) Judges and constitutional judges must com-
ply with the Code of Ethics and Code of Con-
duct of judges. 
Demands for the judge is a legal conse-
quence and professionalism of judges in perform-
ing independent judiciary function to enforce the 
law and justice through judicial bodies. The in-
dependence of judges in performing judicial po-
wer through the state justice agencies, meant 
that judges can truly independent, free and in-
dependent from all interference that can affect 
its function in check, adjudicate and decide a 
case that confronted him. 
The justice system must be reformed to 
achieve justice in favor of the citizens, which is 
more transparent and efficient. The way is: first, 
strengthening the court of first instance (streng-
thening handling litigation, strengthen wise thin-
king, mediate disputes rather than taking decisi-
ons that lead to quarrels, internal court assistan-
ce system). Second, extending the principle of 
the single judge, reorganize the law (the oppor-
tunity to appeal to the court of appeal, rearrange 
15   Arjana Llano, op.cit., page 109-110. 
16   Ibid., page 110 
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the instrument to control the error, the centrali-
zation of power in the highest court in the state; 
reconsideration), and the complaints system.17 
 
Closing 
Conclusion 
1. Judicial independence is an important pillar 
of a state law for judicial independence is a 
necessary condition for maintaining a state of 
law; in a constitutional government, only law 
that is constitutionally legitimate to be en-
forced and the court should have the ability 
to perform tasks in the judicial decisions; in a 
democracy, the court must have a strong au-
tonomy within resist the temptation to give 
too much respect to the economic or political 
power holders. 
2. The norms of independence of judges in per-
forming judicial functions of the judicial po-
wer through state-court set out in Article 24 
paragraph (1), paragraph (2) and paragraph 
(3) the Constitution of 1945. Also Article 1 
Clause 1 and Article 3 paragraph (1) and para-
graph (2) of Law No. 48 Year 2009 on Judicial 
Power. 
 
Suggestion 
It needs an independent judiciary to achie-
ve a good state of law. To realize an independent 
ju-diciary, it is necessary to judge the professio-
nal, transparent and accountable in deciding the 
case in the court and the required optimal con-
trol of the judges in order not to violate the law 
and professional ethics of judges. 
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